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Previous studies on strategic groups have examined issues such as the identification o f  strategic 
groups, the relationship between strategic groups structure and industry performance, and the 
movement of strategic groups over time. I n  contrast to previous studies, this paper uses the 
analytical concepts o f  game theory to  explore the question o f  what strategic groups wil l  exist in 
the future. These benchmark (future) strategic groups represent long-run strategic positions 
available within an industry and thus reference points for firms in developing sustainable 
competitive strategies. The benchmark strategic groups are discussed and comments are offered 
to  illustrate how firms can use the benchmark information to redirect their strategic positions in 
order to survive and remain competitive in the long run. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Hunt (1972) coined the term ‘stratcgic groups’ 
in his study on thc home appliance industry, a 
growing body of empirical literature has adopted 
this concept to analyzc industry structure and to 
identify compktitors and compctitivc positions 
available within the industry (McGee and Thomas, 
1986; Porter, 1980; Cool, 1985). Current empirical 
studics demonstrate that strategic groups exist 
within industries such as brewing (Hatten, 1974), 
petroleum (Newman, 1978) and drugs (Cool & 
Schendel, 1987), a s  well as for a sample of fifty US 
manufacturing industries (Hergert, 1983). 
Several studies have examined the strategic 
groups structure and its relationship to average 
industry profitability. Ncwman (1973, 1978) hy- 
pothesized that heterogeneous strategic groups 
within an industry complicate oligopolists’ agree- 
ment on a common set of market goals and reduce 
their degree of adherence to a tacit agreement. Also, 
the introduction of the concept of strategic groups 
has improved the predictability power of the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm. For ex- 
ample, Hergert ( I  983) explored the structure- 
performance linkage for fifty US manufacturing 
industries and confirmcd Ncwman’s theory that 
performance would not be homogeneous across the 
industry. More specifically, when the ‘conduct’ of 
the industry was represented by the number and 
tightness of the strategic group structure, and the 
distance between and within the groups, it was 
found that ‘conduct’ had a strong impact on aver- 
age industry profitability. Researchers such as Hat- 
ten (1  974), Dess and Davis ( I984), Harrigan ( 1  985), 
Hawcs and Crittenden (1984), Patton (1976), Porter 
( 1  979), Cool and Schendel ( 1  987) and Ficgenbaum 
(1987) havc also found that performance differences 
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exist across strategic groups within the same in- 
dustry. 
Indeed, Porter (1979) used the concepts of stra- 
tegic groups and mobility barriers to develop a 
theory that explains interfirm performance differ- 
ences. According to this theory, the configuration of 
strategic groups (number, size, etc.), the location of 
the strategic group relative to other strategic 
groups, the location of the firm within the strategic 
group and the ability of the firm to implement its 
stratcgy will affect firm performance. In addition, 
the existence of mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 
1977) affects the process of rivalry within an in- 
dustry and explains why persistent performance 
differences exist across strategic groups. Mobility 
barriers protect superior strategic groups from the 
expected invasion of firms from inferior strategic 
groups. 
Finally, another more recent stream of research 
has looked at some dynamic characteristics of 
strategic groups. For example, Cool and Schendel 
(1987) and Fiegenbaum et a/. (1987) found that the 
number of strategic groups changed over the time 
period of their studies, with certain transient groups 
emerging (and then disappearing) around more 
stable long-run strategic groups. It was also found, 
however, that there was a relatively low level of firm 
movement across strategic groups (see also Oster, 
1982). 
Yet, while the preceding review has demonstrated 
the potential usefulness of the strategic groups 
concept in the context of industry analysis and 
competitive interaction, there is still much debate 
about how strategic groups should be identified 
(Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987). While previous 
studies have used exploratory multivariate techni- 
ques such as cluster and factor analysis to identify 
strategic groups, this paper introduces a theoretical 
approach based on game theory concepts to explore 
such important questions as what possible sets of 
strategic groups may exist in the future, how many 
there will be and a derivation of their location on 
the strategic space. The advantage of this approach 
is that the future structure of strategic groups (i.e. 
the long-term viable positions noted by Cool, 1985, 
and Fiegenbaum, 1987), rather than the past and 
present structure typically presented in existing 
research studies, can be identified. This game- 
theoretic approach can therefore complement and 
enrich other methods for studying competitive stra- 
tegy and strategic groups. Taken together with 
multivariate perspectives, it should provide richer 
insight into the reasons for the existence of the 
available strategic positions in the overall com- 
petitive space. 
THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
Kumar (1987) proposes a game-theoretic model of a 
monopolistic competitive industry and shows how 
strategic groups may arise even though firms are 
identical in cost structures and preferences.’ This 
model is very similar to those developed by Karnani 
(1982, 1984a) in the strategy literature. In the 
Kumar model, the identification of strategic groups 
requires the explicit knowledge of the firms’ utility 
functions specified in terms of the set of strategic 
controllable and uncontrollable variables (as is the 
case in Karnani, 1982, 1984a). Unfortunately, the 
estimation of utility functions is an immensely 
difficult task, and consequently the game-theoretic 
model has minimal practical significance from a 
strategy-formulation perspective. 
An alternative model for prediction of the pos- 
sible set of strategic group structures in an industry 
is presented in this section. The model base is 
essentially similar to that of Kumar (1 987) but 
drops the stringent requirement of specific function- 
al forms. The results derived from this model pro- 
vide possible strategic groupings that are called 
theoretical benchmarks (or reference points). These 
benchmarks signify generic groupings that could 
emerge in the process of industry evolution. Recog- 
nizing these generic groupings and the current 
industry structure, a firm can choose to redirect 
itself into the most favorable generic strategy posi- 
tion. 
The basic elements used to model the strategic 
behavior of firms in an industry include goals/ob- 
jectives (personified by a utility function), possible 
actions, scope or resource decisions (involving con- 
trollable strategic variables, say, in the areas of 
marketing, finance and manufacturing) and en- 
vironmental constraints (in the form of non- 
controllable variables) chosen to describe the com- 
petitive nature of the industry. For the sake of 
model exposition the strategic controllable vari- 
ables will be assumed to be marketing strategy M K ,  
measured by the sales-to-marketing expenditure 
ratio, manufacturing strategy M F ,  measured by the 
sales-to-invested capital dollars ratio, and financial 
strategy FN,  measured by the inverse of the 
weighted average cost of capital.’ It is also assumed 
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that they can be computed and controlled by firm- 
level strategists. The non-controllable variables, 
depicting competition, will be assumed to be in- 
dustry average marketing strategy A M  K, industry 
average manufacturing strategy A M F  and industry 
average financial strategy A F N .  
A reasonable behavioral assumption for the con- 
trollable variables is that strategists should exhibit 
increasing preference over the strategy variables; i.e. 
thcy prefer a higher value for the sales-to-marketing 
expenditure ratio, a higher value for the sales-to- 
invested capital dollars ratio, and a higher value for 
FN since a lower weighted average cost of capital 
value is preferred. It is also assumed that each of 
these variables is measured on an ordinal scale, 
relative to the corresponding uncontrollable vari- 
able or industry average variable. More specifically, 
the number of classes on the ordinal scale will be 
restricted to 3, namely, above average, average, 
below average. (See Hall, 1980, for an application of 
this type of measurement.) 
Valid Efficient Frontiers or Benchmark Strategies 
Given the above assumptions, a strategy for a 
firm is defined by the triplet ( M K ,  M F ,  F N )  where 
the values of M K ,  M F  and F N  are measured as 
belonging to one of three classes: (1) below average, 
(2) average, and (3) above average. For example, the 
vector (3,1,3) represents a strategy denoting above- 
average marketing and financial strategies, and 
below-average manufacturing strategy. 
The above definitions dictate that every firm 
choose a point in a cube, each lattice point referring 
to a unique strategy. Given the assumption of 
monotonic firm preferences over the strategic vari- 
ables, the vector (3,3,3), which represents above- 
average strategies in marketing, finance anci manu- 
facturing, is the ideal strategy at any given point in 
time. 
The next assumption is that the viable strategies, 
in any strategic grouping structure, must be those 
on the efficient or current technology frontier. Es- 
sentially, this implies that the frontier strategies are 
not dominated by others on the frontier while, at 
the same time, the frontier forms a dominated pair 
with every other strategy not on it. To make these 
concepts precise: 
Definition: Strategy i ,  namely ( M K , ,  M F , ,  F N , ) ,  
is said to be superior to strategy j ,  namely ( M K , ,  
M F , ,  F N j )  if and only if 
M K i  2 M K j ,  M F i  2 M F j ,  FNi ,  2 F N j  
with, at least, one strict inequality. In this case. 
strategy j is said to be inferior to strategy i .  The pair 
of strategies ( i ,  j )  is said to form a dominated pair. 
DeBnition: Two strategies are mutuully computihlr 
(non-dominated) if neither is superior (or inferior). 
Dejnition: An efficient or current technology fron- 
tierFisasetofstrategies{(MK,, M F , ,  F N , ) , .  . . , 
( M K , , ,  M K , ,  F N , ) }  such that 
Condition (a) Each strategy in F is mutually com- 
patible with evcry other strategy in 
F ;  
Condition (b) All the strategies not in F are either 
superior or inferior to some strategy 
in F i.e. for every strategy not in F 
there is, at least, one strategy in F 
which forms a dominated pair. 
Condition (a) represents the idea that only those 
strategies that are preference-comparable, from the 
firm's perspective, can survive in any strategic 
group structure. Condition (b) ensures that all the 
other available strategies for the firm form domi- 
nated pairs with the efficient frontier; i.e. 
(1) If an available strategy is inferior to one in F,  
then it cannot be on that efficient frontier. 
(2) If an available strategy is superior to any stra- 
tegy in F ,  then, assuming F is the current state of 
the technology, that strategy is not yet achiev- 
able and cannot be on that efficient frontier. 
The two conditions (a) and (b) are similar to the 
definition of the stable set solution concept used 
by Von Ncumann -Morgenstern in game theory 
(Owen, 1968, p. 166). 
For example, strategy (3 ,3 ,3)  is an efficient fron- 
tier set (consisting of one strategy) but it cannot be 
considered a valid fronticr since if this is what the 
entire industry chooses, then this is also the industry 
average. Clearly, it cannot be above average in all 
the strategies! Therefore, to make the concept of 
industry averages compatible with efficient fron- 
tiers, we define: 
Definition: A valid eflicicnt frontier F * is an ellici- 
ent frontier that satisfies condition (c), namely: 
Condition (c) Each variable represented in F *  
must, at least, take on the values of 
above average and below average in 
F*.3  
Each of the strategies in F* are considered to 
depict a strategic group and the entire set F* is 
considered to be a proxy for an equilibrium. The 
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rationale behind this is that the market demand 
may be distributed among the various strategies (in 
F*) in such a way as to allocate equal utility to each 
strategy in F *. In such an event, no firm has any 
inclination to change its strategy (or its membership 
in any group) to another in F*, which makes F* a 
self-sustaining equilibrium strategy frontier. This 
equilibrium concept is a close approximation to the 
notion of the Nash equilibrium used by Karnani 
(1982, 1984a) and Kumar et al. (1984). 
F* is a local equilibrium in the sense that each 
firm is indifferent between the strategies in F * .  
There is an incentive for all firms to achieve a 
strategy that dominates those in F* since, then, the 
other strategies may become dominated, leading to 
higher gains to the firm achieving the dominant 
strategy. 
The Benchmark Model Applied: Example of 
Benchmark Concepts 
Let us consider some simple numerical examples 
that should explain the logic underlying these con- 
cepts. The set { (3,2,3), (3,3,2)} is an efficient fron- 
tier but does not satisfy condition (c) and hence is 
not a valid efficient frontier. The set of strategies { (1, 
1, 3), ( I ,  3, l), (3, 2, 2))  is a valid efficient frontier 
with three strategic groups. The first strategic group 
of firms, using strategy (1,1,3), adopt above-average 
financial strategy (while being below average in the 
other two); the second group, using strategy (1,3, l), 
adopt above-average manufacturing strategy (while 
being below average in the other two) and the third 
strategic group, using strategy (3,2,2), adopt above- 
average marketing strategy while achieving the 
industry average in the other two. No group domi- 
nates any other group and the concept of average is 
maintained. If the market allocates values to the 
three strategic variables in such a way that the 
utility achieved by each of the strategies is the same, 
then the valid efficient frontier is a local strategic 
group equilibrium; i.e. no firm has any incentive to 
move to another strategic group. There is, however, 
an incentive to break out of this equilibrium to a 
more dominant position; e.g. a firm using strategy 
(3,2,2) could direct its resources to increasing its 
manufacturing competence, i.e. move to strategy 
(3,3,2). If it does achieve this, then it will eventually 
eliminate any firm using its previous strategy 
(3,2,2), since it is dominated. I t  also effectively 
dominates the group using strategy ( I ,  3, l )  but 
strategic group (1,1,3) is not dominated. Also, 
{(1,1,3), (3,3,2)} is an efficient frontier but not a 
valid one (since all firms have average or above- 
average financial competence). This implies that, 
with the exit of firms and changes in associated 
strategic group positions, new averages have to be 
computed and a redistribution of firms within the 
strategy cube becomes necessary. 
Results Derived from the Benchmark Model 
Since the strategic space defining the domain of 
feasible strategies (i.e. the cube) is finite (in fact, 27 
possible strategies in the expository case) and the 
frontier is clearly defined, the valid efficient frontiers 
can be completely enumerated. This was done using 
a computer program and the entire list appears in 
the appendix. The following characterization emer- 
ges from analyzing the list: 
Result 1: There are 113 possible valid efficient 
frontier sets F*. Of these six have cardinality 3,40 
have cardinality 4, 57 have cardinality 5, nine have 
cardinality 6 and one has cardinality 7. 
Result 1 lists all possible valid frontiers that may 
have the local optimum property; i.e. no firm will 
desire to move to another existing strategic group. 
This is very similar to the Nash equilibrium concept 
in non-cooperative game theory. Further refine- 
ments in this equilibrium position could be ad- 
dressed in the following way. Which of these stra- 
tegic group equilibria will persist if the utility 
function (i.e. preferences, demand distribution, cost 
structures) is perturbed by a small amount? If the 
equilibrium persists following perturbation, then it 
is said to be structurally stable (similar to the 
continuous space version in Kumar, 1987). 
It is claimed that thosc valid efficient frontiers 
that have strategies that are identical in one dimen- 
sion and perfectly inversely correlated in the other 
two strategies are not stable under perturbation. 
For example, consider F* = { (1, 1,3), (l,3, l), 
(3,2,2)}, in which the strategies (1,1,3) and (1,3,1) 
are equivalent in terms of marketing strategy and 
symmetric but inversely correlated (i.e. (1,3) and 
(3,l))  in terms of manufacturing and financial stra- 
tegies. If F* is to be an equilibrium, then the utility 
associated with these strategies is exactly the same 
or there is an imputed symmetric valuation of the 
manufacturing and financial strategies. If we per- 
turb this valuation in favor of either of these 
dimensions (say, manufacturing) then utility equa- 
lization can only be potentially regained (assuming 
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only the lower utility group, i.e. ( I ,  I ,  3) moves) by the 
configuration ( I ,  2,3) and (1,3, I), i.e. an improve- 
ment in manufacturing strategy by the first stra- 
tegic group. However, then F*= ( ( I ,  2, 3), (1,  3, I ) ,  
(3,2,2)} is no longer eflicient it needs the strategy 
(3,1,3) to make it a valid efficient frontier. This 
shows that the nature of the strategic group com- 
pletely changes with just a minor perturbation. This 
leads to Result 2, which indicates all the structurally 
stable valid efficient frontiers: 
Result 2: The only structurally stable valid efficient 
frontiers (i.e. benchmark strategic group structures) 
F** are 12 in number and are: 
(1 )  { ( l , l , 3 ) , ( I , 2 , 2 ) , ( ~ , l , 2 ) , ( 3 , 3 , 1 ) }  
(2) {(I,l33), (1,3,2)9 (2,1,2), (3,3,1)} 
(3) { (1,1,3), (1,3,2), (3,2,2), (3,3,1)} 
(4) {(1,1,3),(2,3,2),(3,1,2),  (3,3,1)} 
( 5 )  {(1,2,2), (l,3,1), (3, 1,3), (3,2,1)} 
(6 )  {(l,2,3), (1,3,1), (2,2, I), (3,1,3)} 
(7) {(1,2,3), (1,3, I), (3, l,3), (3,2,2)} 
(8) ~ 3 ,  I), (2,2,3), (3, ~ 3 ) ~  (3,2, I ) }  
(9) {(l,3,3), (2,1,2)> (293, I), (3,1,1)} 
(10) {(1*3,3), (2,1,3)3 (272, I), (3,I, 1 ) )  
(11) {(L3,3), (2,1,3), (2,3,2), (3,1,1)} 
(12) {(l,3,3), (2,2,3),(2,3,1),(3,1,1)} 
A rationale for studying stable frontiers is that 
one might be looking at the mature stage of the 
industry life cycle, where there is potentially the 
most stable industry structure with relatively minor 
environmental perturbations. This model would 
therefore predict that for industries in the mature 
stage of their life cycles (given the three strategic 
dimensions of marketing, manufacturing and finan- 
cial strategies), only the above stable frontiers F ** 
can emerge. 
Some features of the stable frontiers are worth 
mentioning: 
Essentially, there exist only jbur generic stable 
frontiers. The other eight are permutations in 
terms of the dimensions. For example, given 
stable frontiers (1)+4), we can generate (5)48) by 
interchanging the Manufacturing and Finance 
dimensions and (9H12) by interchanging the 
Marketing and Finance dimensions. 
The cardinality of all the stable frontiers is 
exactly 4. This fits with the instability theorem 
in Kumar (1987) which states that given three 
strategic dimensions, only three plus one or four 
strategics, at most, can occur. Further, it is 
conjectured that this result is independent of the 
arbitrary measurement of the strategic dimen- 
sions within three classes. 
In all the stable frontiers there is always one 
strategic dimension that is present only in 
above- and below-average classes while the 
other two appear in all three classes. 
In line with (2), the strategy (2,2,2) or average in 
all three dimensions is not a stable strategy. This 
implies that in any mature industry, firms prob- 
ably have to specialize; i.e. be superior in at least 
one dimension, be it marketing, manufacturing 
or finance. This is consistcnt with Porter's ( 1  980) 
argument about generic strategies. 
There is equi-preference shown across the 
twelve stable frontiers. Therefore it is impossible 
to predict which strategic group structures may 
obtain in the future. These twelve strategies, 
however, provide stable valid efficient frontiers 
and thus serve as the basis for the development 
of the four generic stable benchmark structures. 
The relationship of Results 1 and 2, in particular, 
and the benchmark model, in general, to industry 
analysis and strategic management is discussed in 
the next section. 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
IMPLICATIONS 
In the previous section a specific model form was 
used to illustrate how the concept of dominated 
strategies could develop valid eflicient frontiers F *. 
These frontiers were refined, using structural stabil- 
ity concepts, to derive the benchmark strategic 
group structures F**. This section shows how these 
frontiers can be useful in formulating firms' future 
competitive strategy. In performing this task we 
first describe how to identify and formulate the 
relevant competitive strategy space and how to 
define the efficient frontiers. Second, we will analyze 
the various strategies that firms should consider in 
order to position themselves on these frontiers in 
order to survive in the long run. 
Formulating the Strategy Space 
Researchers in the area of business policy/strategic 
management have taken different approaches to 
formulate strategic groups. Thomas and Venka- 
traman (1987) have identified and classified the 
dominant perspectives in the treatment of strategic 
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groups based on a two-dimensional scheme, name- 
ly, the operationalization of strategy and the ap- 
proach adopted for the development of the group. 
The description of this classification is summarized 
in Fig. I .  
The choice of the first dimension, the operat- 
ionalization of strategy, reflects the idea that the 
value of strategic groups as a competitive construct 
depends on the manner in which the strategy con- 
cept is operationalized (see also McGee and 
Thomas, 1986). In viewing this dimension, Thomas 
and Venkatraman (1987) distinguish between those 
studies that have operationalized strategy in narrow 
terms (focusing on one functional area or one dimen- 
sion) versus those that view strategy in relatively 
broader terms (focusing on multiple functional areas 
or multidimensional). This approach is consistent 
with other strategic management researchers that 
distinguish between the ‘parts’ versus ‘holistic’ view 
(Hambrick, 1980) or the ‘undimensional’ versus 
‘multidimensional’ (Porter, 1980) view of strategy. 
The second dimension of the scheme focuses on 
the methodologies used to identify strategic groups. 
Thomas and Venkatraman point out that some 
researchers specify the characteristics of the group a 
priori based on theoretical explanation, whereas 
other researchers havc used statistical techniques to 
identify group members. For example, Porter ( 1  979) 
used market share to assign a priori group members 
while Harrigan (1985) employed the cluster analysis 
technique to develop strategic groups based on 
strategic postures involving several strategic vari- 
ables simultaneously. 
Based on this two-by-two matrix, four different 
strategies exist to formulate strategic groups. Each 
approach has its own set of assumptions, goals, 
strengths and limitations. Our recommendation is 
that since strategy formulation is a complex task, 
especially when strategists have to confront future 
strategies, a multiple-perspective approach may 
often be appropriate and sensible. Morespecifically, 
each of the four strategies should be considered and 
alternative strategic groups scenarios should be 
explored and examined. This is consistent with 
Porter’s ( 1  985) request for scenario analysis in 
strategic management as a means of identifying 
sustainable competitive strategy positions. 
Another important question raised by this re- 
search is whether the strategic dimensions that 
characterize strategic groups will differ in the future 
from those relevant either now or in the past. Most 
strategic-group studies assume that these dimen- 
sions do not change over time. I t  is known, how- 
ever, that firms use different ways to compete over 
time. For example, the literature on technological 
change (e.g. Freeman, 1983) suggests that innov- 
ation encourages firms to look for different strateg- 
ies, whether to exploit first-mover advantages or 
other technical capabilities and skills. Our recom- 
mendation is that these aspects should also be 
NARROW 
(‘parts’) 
(unidimensional) 
BROAD 
(‘holistic’) 
(multidimensional) 
Description. A priori Description. Empirical 
definition using a narrow 
conceptualization of conceptualization of 
strategy, and may be strategy 
empirically supported 
development using a narrow 
(1) (11) 
Description. A priori Description. Empirical 
definition using a broader 
conceptualization of conceptualization of 
strategy, and may be strategy 
empirically supported 
development using a broader 
(111) (IV) 
A priori A posteriori 
(Theoretically specified and (Empirically derived) 
may be empirically suppor- 
ted) 
APPROACH TO GROUP DEVELOPMENT 
Figure 1. Classificatory scheme for strategic groups research. (Source: Thomas 
and Venkatraman, 1987) 
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considered as part of the scenario analysis re- 
commended earlier. 
In summary, once the strategy space is identified 
existing methodologies can be used to identify past 
and current strategic groups. Then, the methodol- 
ogy developed in this study can be adopted to 
identify benchmark strategic groups that focus on 
the future benchmark group positions. Based on 
this procedure, firms should consider different stra- 
tegies in order to move toward the sustainable 
benchmark groups. These strategies will be consid- 
ered next. 
Strategic Moves 
As noted in the model discussion, the efficient 
frontier is an isoprofit curve, meaning that the firm 
is indifferent about the choice of where to position 
itself as long as it is on the curve. Two factors should 
condition such choices. First, the costs associated 
with strategic moves and, second, the sequential 
moves that may be available after the relocation of 
the firm on the efficient frontier. 
The cost criterion indicates that the firm should 
choose the strategic pattern or posture that minim- 
izes its movement costs. A cost analysis of the 
movement between the current strategic group 
position and any one of the strategic groups on the 
efficient frontier has to be calculated. The firm's 
resources, both in terms of tangible and intangible 
assets, should be examined leading to an analysis 
consistent with Wernerfelt's ( 1984) resource-based 
view of strategic redirection. In  contrast, the 
sequcntial moves criterion emphasizes the alter- 
natives available for the firm when it  is positioned 
on the efficient frontier and considers potential 
future moves if the industry is impacted by a 
structural change. 
For example, consider the strategic positions 
adopted in the US automobile industry in the 1970s 
and, particularly, the positioning of General 
Motors and Ford on three critical dimensions: cost, 
quality and innovative products. G M  and Ford had 
achieved average levels of quality and innovative 
products but G M  had a low-cost position. Clearly, 
Ford's strategy was dominated as evidenced by its 
declining performance. At about this time, the 
Japanese manufacturers entered the industry with 
average innovative products, lower cost than GM 
and above-average level of quality. Ford moved its 
strategy to produce at  a higher level in terms of 
innovative products and quality while GM pursued 
lower cost and higher quality levels through tec- 
hnology acquisition. It appears that Ford's move 
was easier to achieve both in terms of cost as well as 
time; GM's move, at least in the short run, does not 
seem to have borne fruit while being extremely 
expensive (Business Week,  1988). Our analysis indi- 
cates that the alternative strategies facing GM 
(namely, more innovative products/improve quality 
and lower cost/improve quality) can be identified 
and management can then assess which route to 
take by considering criteria involving cost and 
future flexibility. Since this strategic moves analysis 
of the automobile industry may be criticized as 
being too simplistic, let us return to examples that 
illustrate similar arguments but in the context of the 
previously developed expository model used in the 
model results section. 
By observing the benchmark strategic groups 
and also the current strategic groups, firms can 
make decisions as to what direction they should 
take. For example, suppose that the industry cur- 
rently shows the following strategic groups struc- 
(3,1,3)}. Let us focus on the strategy of a firm in the 
strategic group (l ,2,  I ) ,  which is in a disastrous 
position (since it is dominated by firms using stra- 
tegies (l,2,3) and ( I ,  3, I)). It needs to spend re- 
sources improving its position uis-a-uis its com- 
petition. Which position should it aim for, given its 
current position'? The groups (l,2,3), (1,3, 1) and 
(3,1,3) do not dominate one another and represent 
stable positions in benchmark groups 6 and 7 of 
Result 2. The easiest (and probably least expensive) 
action would be to aim for strategy (2,2, I), which is 
the remaining element of benchmark group 6. This 
implies that the firm in group ( I ,  2 , l )  has to improve 
its marketing strategy. 
Continuing this analysis further, a firm in the 
strategic group (1,1,2) is in an equally disastrous 
position (being dominated by firms using strategies 
( I ,  2,3) and (3,1,3)). It may choose to adopt as its 
objective the strategy (1,2,3) rather than strategy 
(2,2, I),  since in the latter case it will have to worsen 
its financial strategy position, while in the former 
case, it will be building on its strengths. After the 
decision has been made, it must attempt to improve 
its manufacturing and financial strategies. 
This type of matrix formulation to identify stra- 
tegic postures of firms in an industry has been used 
by Hall (1980) in his well-known paper on survival 
strategies. Hall's research is a strategic analysis of 
two factors, i.e. cost and differentiation, in a variety 
ture, namely, {(1,1,2), (l,2, I), (1,2,3), (1,3, I ) ,  
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of basic industries. In the heavy-duty truck industry 
(Exhibit, VII, pp. 81, Hall, 1980), Ford and Paccar 
form the efficient frontier, not dominating each 
other, with Ford having an edge in cost and Paccar 
in relative performance. All the other firms have 
strategies that are dominated and hence achieve 
lower financial performance. From a strategic man- 
agement perspective, all the dominated firms should 
try to move, imitating either Ford or Paccar (assu- 
ming that cost and performance are the only dimen- 
sions of competition). As they move, the industry 
matrix structure will change and new analyses will 
need to be conducted. 
While concurring with Hall’s analysis in this 
context, our concept of efficient frontiers leads to 
different conclusions about the attainment of a 
dynamic equilibrium. Hall postulates that four in- 
dustry strategic groups will exist ranging from 
leadership position to marginal/failing position. 
Our analysis (as well as that of Karnani, 1984b) 
claims that this cannot be an individually rational 
equilibrium since there is every incentive for the 
firms in the marginal positions to move from their 
current strategy (unless there are major mobility 
barriers erected between groups-more on this 
below). Karnani’s analysis uses the concept of Nash 
equilibrium strategies which, by definition, leads to 
local stability in terms of individual firm strategies. 
Using our analysis, the only valid efficient frontier 
set is composed of the following strategies: (high 
differentiation, high cost), (low differentiation, low 
cost) and (average differentiation, average cost). 
This is not a stable valid efficient frontier. 
Both Hall and Karnani motivate strategic posi- 
tions with a balance between factors,, in their case 
cost and differentiation. In Hall’s analysis, the ‘next 
best position’ is slightly above-average differenti- 
ation, slightly below-average cost. In Karnani’s 
analysis, the cross-elasticities between these two 
factors decide what the balance should be. In our 
framework there exists no stable valid efficient 
frontier with (average M K ,  average M F ,  average 
F N )  strategy, i.e. no display of the ‘stuck-in-the- 
middle’ syndrome (Porter, 1980). 
Our analysis procedure is designed to aid strate- 
gists (just as Hall’s analysis). It formalizes Hall’s 
procedures for cases with more than two strategic 
factors and introduces the concepts of domination 
(in lieu of equilibrium). While Karnani uses similar 
constructs of equilibrium, his analysis is more to 
provide insight (similar to Kumar, 1987) and not a 
formalized procedure for strategists to implement. 
It is difficult (as noted earlier) to obtain consumer 
utility functions and producer profit functions ex- 
plicitly (especially with more than two strategic 
factors). Our concepts are valid for any number of 
dimensions and can be easily implemented (as 
shown by Hall). 
An important element in considering strategic 
movement by firms (such as those that are domi- 
nated) is the existence of mobility barriers (see the 
Ford/Paccar example). The theory of mobility bar- 
riers (see Caves and Porter, 1977) argues that 
barriers not only protect firms in a strategic group 
from entry by firms outside the industry, but also 
provide barriers to firms within the industry in 
moving from one strategic group to another. Mobil- 
ity barriers vary among strategic groups and they 
are not industry-specific. Mobility barriers are en- 
dogenous variables in an industry, and strategic 
group members are motivated to contribute to the 
building of mobility barriers. When mobility bar- 
riers are considered, the decision of what direction a 
firm should take becomes more complicated. As 
was noticed by Caves and Porter, the course of 
action that maximizes expected returns may involve 
a sequence of moves rather than a direct move. 
SUMMARY 
Research in the area of strategic groups and com- 
petitive strategy has concentrated mainly on 
describing the past and present structure of stra- 
tegic groups. In contrast, this study has focused on 
trying to predict the future structure of strategic 
groups. These benchmark strategic groups should 
be the target for strategic planners in directing the 
entire firm into viable future positions. 
The paper has argued that different approaches 
should be taken in order to formulate strategic 
groups. For each approach, current strategic 
groups as well as the efficient frontiers that rep- 
resent benchmark strategic groups should be iden- 
tified. Then, the firms’ strategists should analyze the 
best direction to take considering two major fac- 
tors: the costs associated with the movement and 
the ‘sequential moves’ alternatives associated with 
future redirection. 
Future research in this area can be extended into 
two major avenues. First, on the theoretical side, 
analytical models can be developed in order to 
determine what is the optimal pattern for strategic 
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redirection. Second, empirical studies that explore 
the efficient frontiers of industries, and how firms 
reposition themselves, should be encouraged. At 
this stage, our purpose has been to provide an aid to 
the strategic manager. We hope that this approach 
will highlight some new aspects to the many 
ongoing empirical studies on strategic groups. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix, the problem formulation for the 
eficient frontier model is explained and also the 
listing of the valid efficient frontiers F* is given. 
The problem formulation is as follows: 
strategy space C = { (i, j ,  k ) l  i = I ,  2,3, 
j =  1,2,3, k =  1 ,2 ,3}  
strategy = (i, j ,  k )  = ( M K ,  M F ,  F N )  
where 
marketing strategy M K  
manufacturing strategy M F  = 2, average 
financial strategy FN 
Enumerate 
1, below average 
3, above average I (or) (or) 
F* = { ( i l ,  jl, k ,  ), . . . , (i,, j , ,  k , ) (  they form 
valid efficient frontiers} 
There are 1 13 such valid efficient frontiers and these 
are listed in Table A l .  
Table A l .  
Nuinher 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
I 
8 
9 
1 0  
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
<‘ardinalily 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Valid cilicirnl lronlier blralegies 
113 131 322 
113 232 311 
122 313 331 
131 223 311 
133 212 331 
133 221 313 
113 122 212 331 
113 122 312 331 
113 131 222 311 
113 132 212 331 
113 132 221 312 
113 132 231 322 
113 132 322 331 
113 232 312 321 
113 232 312 331 
113 232 322 331 
Table A l .  
Numbcr 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
31 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
41  
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
51  
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
61 
68 
69 
I0 
71 
72 
1 3  
74 
I5 
Continued. 
C.irdindlily V d i d  cllicicnt lronlicr atr.ilcgic\ 
4 122 131 221 313 
4 122 131 313 321 
4 122 213 231 311 
4 122 213 312 331 
4 122 231 313 321 
4 123 131 212 321 
4 123 131 213 322 
4 123 131 221 313 
4 123 131 313 322 
4 123 132 212 331 
4 123 132 221 313 
4 123 213 232 311 
4 123 232 313 321 
4 131 223 312 321 
4 131 223 313 321 
4 131 223 313 322 
4 132 223 231 311 
4 132 223 312 331 
4 133 212 221 311 
4 133 212 231 311 
4 133 212 231 321 
4 133 213 221 311 
4 133 213 221 312 
4 133 213 231 322 
4 133 213 232 311 
4 133 222 313 331 
4 133 223 231 311 
4 133 223 232 311 
4 133 223 313 332 
4 133 232 323 331 
5 113 122 131 212 321 
5 113 122 131 221 312 
5 113 122 131 312 321 
5 113 122 212 231 311 
5 113 122 212 231 321 
5 113 122 231 321 321 
5 113 131 22 312 312 
5 113 132 212 221 311 
5 113 132 212 231 311 
5 113 132 212 231 321 
5 113 132 222 231 311 
5 113 132 222 312 331 
5 I13 122 131 212 321 
5 113 122 131 222 312 
5 113 122 131 312 321 
5 113 122 212 231 311 
5 113 122 212 231 321 
5 113 122 231 312 321 
5 122 131 213 221 311 
5 122 131 213 221 312 
5 122 131 213 312 321 
5 122 213 231 312 321 
5 123 131 212 221 311 
5 123 131 213 221 311 
5 123 131 213 221 312 
5 123 131 213 222 311 
5 123 131 222 313 321 
5 123 132 212 221 311 
5 123 132 212 231 311 
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Table A l .  Continued. 
Nuniher (‘ardinslil) 
I6 5 
77 5 
I X  5 
79 5 
80 5 
81 5 
x2 5 
83 5 
84 5 
85 5 
X6 5 
87 5 
88 5 
89 5 
YO 5 
91 5 
92 5 
93 5 
94 5 
95 5 
96 5 
97 5 
98 5 
99 5 
100 5 
101 5 
102 5 
103 5 
104 6 
105 6 
I06 6 
107 6 
108 6 
109 6 
I10 6 
111 6 
I12 6 
113 I 
Valid cfficieiil l roniw rtrdlegier 
123 132 212 231 321 
123 132 213 221 311 
123 132 213 221 312 
123 132 213 231 322 
123 132 213 322 331 
123 132 222 313 331 
123 132 231 313 322 
123 132 313 322 331 
123 213 232 312 321 
123 213 232 312 331 
123 213 232 322 331 
132 232 313 322 331 
132 223 231 312 321 
132 223 231 313 321 
132 223 231 313 322 
132 223 313 322 331 
133 213 222 231 311 
133 213 222 312 331 
133 213 232 312 321 
133 213 232 312 331 
133 213 232 322 331 
133 222 231 313 321 
133 223 231 312 321 
133 223 231 313 321 
133 223 231 313 322 
133 223 232 312 321 
133 223 232 312 331 
133 223 232 313 321 
113 122 131 212 221 311 
113 132 222 231 312 321 
113 122 131 212 221 311 
123 131 213 222 312 321 
123 132 213 222 231 311 
123 132 213 222 312 331 
123 132 222 231 313 321 
133 213 222 231 312 321 
133 223 232 313 322 331 
123 132 213 222 231 312 321 
1. The results of that paper, namely, that the number of 
strategic groups is critically dependent on aggregated 
competitor strategies, remains valid when the strin- 
gent assumption of identical competitors (i.e. same 
form of utility function and parameters) is relaxed. 
2. The marketing and manufacturing strategy variables 
involve measuring sales. Since sales for the next period 
is unknown and normally uncontrollable (i.e. not 
directly controllable except in a monopoly), the figure 
used could be sales for the last period or even fore- 
casted sales for the next. The choice of the inverse of 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) rather 
than WACC itself, as the financial strategy variable, is 
to facilitate increasing preference over this variable 
This condition also eliminates the possibility of all the 
strategies using the same average value for any vari- 
able. The reason for this is that this variable is no 
longer strategic; i.e. no firm differentiates itself from its 
competitors on this variable. 
Here we are assuming that the industry being studied 
or analyzed has been in existence for some period of 
time. 
For debates on the operationalization of the ‘strategy’ 
concept in the strategic management discipline, see 
Ginsberg (1984), Hambrick (1980), Snow and Ham- 
brick (1980) and Venkatraman and Grant (1986). 
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